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Use of DEA to Evaluate Non-linear and Imprecise Information in Construction
Contractor Performance
Gerald H. Williams, Jr., Timothy R. Anderson
Department of Engineering Technology Management, Portland State University, USA
Abstract- This paper explores the use of Data Envelopment
Analysis as a tool to evaluate the efficiency of building
construction projects in Oregon where the inputs, including,
“reported information” available prior to pricing and
contractor selection is imprecise or at least, cannot be entirely or
accurately captured by exogenous measures. This work builds
on prior work in the field that evaluated missing, imprecise or
non-existent information in DEA models and has broad
application to the service sector of the economy where
information is the prime input in the system.

I. INTRODUCTION
The generic economic production model used in the Data
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) methodology assumes a linear
relationship between inputs and outputs even though we are
unaware of precisely how those inputs are translated to
outputs. For example: if one were to use DEA to evaluate the
efficiency of automobiles, the input might be gallons of
gasoline and the output miles driven. The most output for a
fixed input or the least input for a fixed output would be a
measure of automobile efficiency.
However, DEA
researchers recognized a some time ago that not all
automobiles are created equal and it is nonsensical to
compare fuel efficiency of say an Austin Mini to Chevrolet
Suburban; the auto’s have significantly different missions and
what we may refer to as “economies of scale” or as Zhu [1]
does, “Convexity.” Banker formulated a variable returns to
scale (VRS) method to accommodate the economies of scale
problem [2].
The VRS model allows for economic
comparisons among a relatively narrow range, however the
basic assumption that underlies Banker’s formulation remains
the linear relationship between inputs and outputs.
While the VRS method would, most likely, exclude the
comparison of the Mini to the Suburban, it almost certainly
would not exclude the comparison of two Suburban’s with
different amounts of inputs and outputs. And if there was a
distinctly non-linear relationship between the amount of gas
input and say the number of passenger-miles output, this
would merely show up as inefficiency in one of the two
vehicles (or perhaps even the same vehicle on two separate
trials.) However, there may be a very good reason for the
differences that are not based on “efficiency” but rather a
non-linear relationship between inputs and outputs, in the
example due to the different configurations of the
automobile.
There are a number of commercial institutions where the
economic transactions can be characterized by non-linear
relationships between inputs and outputs – in particular, those
where there are limiting boundaries for either measure or
endogenous effects that cannot be fully captured. This is

particularly true with professional services where input
resources like “information,” and output measures “time” and
“cost” have definite fixed boundaries. An example that
comes to mind almost immediately is weather prediction.
Without virtually any information, it is easy to predict that
the weather at any location on the planet by simply knowing
the location and having some idea of the historical climate.
For example, we can say that the temperature in Portland,
Oregon tomorrow will range between 5º Fahrenheit and 105º
F. We can say this because no matter what the time of the
year, because we know historical climate data, that the
extreme temperatures ever recorded in Portland fall within
these boundaries. With little more information, like the day
of the year requested, we can narrow that range significantly.
But, no matter how much money we invest, we know that we
cannot exactly predict the weather six months from now.
Therefore there is a distinctly non-linear relationship between
the amount of information paid for as an input, and the
accuracy of the output prediction of temperature.
The same relationship can be said to be true in the
construction sector of the economy. Without almost no
information, we know that the cost of construction is finite,
and exists within some approximate range, say between $1
and $5000 per square foot. The amount of information
collected by the owner and transmitted to the contractor,
narrows the range of costs considerably, but simply cannot
eliminate the variability or range entirely, in part because the
building environment exists in “weather” that cannot be
reliably predicted. The question many owners want answered
is, “how much information should I pay for in order to reduce
the uncertainty in the pricing and how much information is
simply a waste of resources, given the cost boundaries?”
In the public sector of the construction industry in
Oregon, owners have the opportunity to select and contract
with contractors relying on less than complete construction
documents, which is nearly unique among states in the US [3]
[4]. Beginning in the 1980’s, public agencies in Oregon
started to use alternative construction contractor selection
methods to hire builders for public projects. This process
was authorized by law1 as early as 1977, but little used prior
to the mid to late 1980’s, particularly in the building sector of
the construction industry. The common contractor selection
method used since the public bidding laws were enacted in
the 1930’s was by sealed competitive bid (commonly known
as Design-Bid-Build, DBB or Lump Sum Bid, LSB method.)
However, by the early 1980’s several public owners and
construction contractors felt that the DBB method was a
1

See Oregon Revised Statues: ORS 279.015 (as amended)
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principal factor in an ever increasing litigious market sector,
delays in completion, increasing insurance rates and bond
costs and overall lowering of the quality of work. As a
remedy, first the Port of Portland2 and next the Portland
authorized
negotiated
Development
Commission3
procurements on their respective construction projects (called
CM/GC jobs for Construction Manager / General Contractor
method.) From the 1980’s to the year 2000, public agencies
in Oregon have constructed more than five hundred public
building projects that cost more than a million dollars
($1,000,000) each4 and representing in excess of five billion
dollars ($5,000,000,000) in tax expenditures. At least one
hundred thirty5 of those projects were negotiated
procurements where contractor selection was based at least in
part on prior performance of the firm (including overall
project quality of performance metrics.) While there have
been some attempts to analyze or audit specific CM/GC
projects6, there have been no prior attempts to evaluate a
large set of these projects and compare their collective
performance against the more widely used competitive bid
project delivery system (PDS.)
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
A. Information and Contractor Selection
“Winner’s Curse” or adverse selection is widely studied
in field of competitive economics and it is of particular
concern in the public sector of the construction industry
where most owners continue to use DBB as their primary
PDS. Kagel [5] and others have studied common value
auctions and the winner’s curse in the construction industry
and concluded that, while experienced construction bidders
are subject to winners curse affects, the construction market
attempts to correct for the curse by employing three
strategies7: withdrawal of a low bid due to error,
subcontractor buyout, and by overpricing change orders.
Kagel also points out that there is a significant amount of
“private information” in the bidding environment that is not
accounted for by the plans and specifications, some of which
2
The first known competitive negotiation selection for a construction
contractor was the then K-Wing of terminal south at the Portland
International Airport. It is not known why this project received an
exemption from public bidding, no records of this project currently exist.
3
The second known competitive negotiation selection for a construction
contractor was for the Yamhill parking structure serving the Pioneer Place
downtown development. The process was justified in that project because
the PDC had bad experiences in the past with projects that did not finish on
time and the parking structure had to finish prior to the opening of the mixed
use development for holiday season. Increasing liquidated damages to cover
the risk of developer lost profits was thought to be an uneconomical
approach to ensuring the project opened on time.
4
Our study focused on projects costing more than $5 million, but we did
drop down to as low as $1 million in order to obtain as many negotiated
projects as we could.
5
There are 127 known negotiated procurements in the database, and another
four dozen or more project that the selection method is not known (whether
lump sum bid or negotiated procurement.)
6
Oregon’s Secretary of State’s Audit Division, audited three major prison
projects.
7
Although not necessarily by these names.

can be characterized as “experience” of the bidders and
reliance on “rules-of-thumb” in bidding. One strategy that
Kagel omits however, which might just be the most
important, is the bonding of subcontractor’s, which serves to
almost entirely eliminate the general contractor’s greatest
risk: the risk of a major subcontractor failing to perform on
their contract.
In Kagel’s brief review of the construction industry for
his research, he concludes that contractor’s rely primarily on
the plans and specifications as the primary information as a
basis for their bid. In fact, that proposition is solidly
embedded in both Federal and Oregon Contract Law.8
Information Model
The amount of information available to a construction
contractor at the time pricing or selection is required is never
complete.
Figure 1 shows four assumed states of
information: the lowest figure (arrow) represents all or
“complete” information. Clearly, this ideal is never achieved,
as indicated in the second from bottom figure in the set. This
is the theoretical DBB competitive bid model of information
upon which virtually all contracts and construction law are
based. It provides that the basis for all competitive contracts
or scope of work for all competitive contracts is based solely
on information provided by the Owner (typically by and
through their consultant architects and engineers) and the
State of Nature. The State of Nature concept is based on an
acceptable or typical performance of the States of Nature,
usually meaning the “weather” but also includes such things
as normally expected underground and hidden conditions.
The amount of information regarding the State of Nature can
be increased by expending time, effort and funds to make
better predictions about the State of Nature, such as paying
for the consultants to perform underground soils
investigations. But some States of Nature, in particular the
weather, are outside the bounds of investigation, particularly
on long term projects which are the subject of this study. The
standard in the construction industry is to use the “average”
State of Nature as a benchmark for what the bidders should
expect to encounter. Only if the actual State of Nature of the
weather is abnormally adverse, will there be an amendment to
the Contract.
The “Competitive Bid Contract Model” more accurately
reflects the actual state of information in the competitive
contract method, where the actual information provided at the
time of pricing is less than Complete Information, by both the
State of Nature and Errors and Omissions in the information
provided by the Owner. This leads to the contractual
provisions in most construction contracts that allow for
amendments to the Contract based on errors or omissions.

8
See In United States v. Spearin, 248 U.S. 132, 39 S.Ct. 59, 63 L. Ed. 166
(1918), and Oregon, A.H. Barbour & Sons, Inc. v. State Highway
Commission, 248 Or. 247, 433 P.2d 847 (1967); General Construction
Company v. Oregon State Fish Commission, 26 Or. App. 577, 554 P2d 185
(1976).
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Information provided by
the Owner

Information supplemented by
the Contractor

ERROR

Subject to:

Negotiated Procurement Contract Model

Information provided by the Owner

ERROR

STATE OF
NATURE

Theoretical Contract Model

COMPLETE INFORMATION

Figure 1: Various Construction Bidding Models

The top figure in the Information model is the CM/GC
model where the amount of information presented at the time
of selection or pricing is admittedly less than complete than
provided in the DBB model. This model recognizes the
construction contractor’s ability to exercise judgment and
requires him to fill in the gaps between the amount of
information given and what is required to derive a Contract
price.
B. DEA Methodology
DEA is a widely studied methodology as demonstrated
by Tavares [6] and Seiford [7]. For a complete discussion of
the development of DEA and the different DEA Models the
reader is referred to: [8], [9] and [1]. For the purposes of this
paper, we present only a brief discussion to support our use of
DEA in this research.
DEA is a non-parametric, linear programming based
method for evaluating relative efficiencies of Decision
Making Units or DMUs. DEA was originally devised by [10]
as a method to derive relative efficiencies of different
organizations or activities using multiple inputs and multiple
outputs. The focus on comparative efficiency using multiple
inputs and outputs was, in part generated by the desire to
measure factors other than financial performance such as
sales and profitability.
The linear programming method used in DEA evaluates
a weighted sum of the various outputs divided by a weighted
sum of the various inputs, in the model, while leaving the
weighting scheme left up to the particular DMU, in order to
maximize its DEA score. This “Ratio Model” is expressed
mathematically, in the form as:
s

∑u y
Max: h0 =

r =1
m

r

∑v x
i =1

i

r ,0

;
i ,0

r =1
m

∑ vi xi, j

STATE OF
NATURE

Competitive Bid Contract Model

Information provided by the Owner

s

∑ ur yr , j

STATE OF
NATURE

≤ 1 j = 1, ..., n;

i =1

ur , vi ≥ 0;

r = 1, ..., s ;

i = 1, ..., m.

In the model, the xij, yrj, are the known inputs and outputs
of the jth DMU and the ur's and vi's are the variable (or
criteria) weights to be determined by the solution of the linear
program9. That is, DEA allows each DMU0 to pick the
weighting scheme that maximizes its efficiency score relative
to all other DMUs, subject to the constraint that any other
DMU, with an identical weighting scheme, cannot achieve an
efficiency score greater than 1.0. The weighting scheme
adopted by each individual DMU can be considered to reflect
that specific DMU’s strategy for converting inputs into
outputs. For example a given DMU strategy may be to put
all of its weight on one particular input and one particular
output, and if that DMU has the highest ratio of these two
metrics it will be deemed efficient.
1. Current DEA Application Areas
Seiford [7] and Tavares [6] have traced the evolution of
DEA and provided a comprehensive bibliography of DEA
papers that includes more than 1,500 and 3,200 references
respectively. DEA’s principal application has been to
determine relative efficiencies using both financial and nonfinancial performance measures. The ability to include nonfinancial performance measures has lead to initial
applications in the Education, Government and Healthcare
fields. More recently, banking, warehousing, and the airline
industries have also been major application areas where DEA
has been used to combine both financial and non-financial
performance measures.
2. DEA in the Construction Industry
The construction and building industry is often times
called the single largest industry in the United States, and the
largest single sector of the US economy representing between
10 and 12% of GDP. It would seem, given the industry size
and impact on the economy, there would be plenty of
Construction Industry applications of DEA; that is not
however the case. DEA applications in the construction
industry have been limited to a few papers including:
building sector research [11], road construction vehicle
management [12, 13], and nuclear power plant construction
times [14]. These applications have not directly involved a
broad analysis of construction project management of major
capital construction.
Perhaps one of the reasons DEA has not been used to
evaluate project management on major capital construction
9
Note that, as shown, the mathematical model is a non-linear formulation.
Linearizing this formulation is discussed in the referenced DEA texts.
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projects, or project management in general, is the problem of
determining what inputs and outputs to use and how to
measure them with any precision. In order to deal with
imprecise measures of inputs and outputs, Cooper [15] and
Zhu [16] have developed methods that use Ordinal and
Categorical variables instead of direct measures. In this
research, the direct measures are known and quantifiable, but
fail to capture all of the influences on inputs in the system.
III. DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS
A. Type of Data Required
The basic Construction Project model assumed for this
research is shown in Figure 2:

Input Information

Construction
Project

Output Performance

Figure 3, illustrates the initial DEA model that resulted
from two rounds of surveys and discussions with the industry
experts. The Owner/Designer experience, Labor recruitment,
budget expectations and Access to Site metrics were derived
from subjective rankings based on a 1-5 scale. As a proxy for
Construction Team Experience, the construction team project
manager’s experience in number of years of construction
experience (at any professional level) was used.
The percent complete of the “plans and specifications”
was also something of a subjective measure because there is
no exact definition or consistent measure of completeness
used in the industry. Architects, according to the Experts,
typically consider their work as a process moving from:
Conceptual Design to Schematic Design, to Design
Development or Preliminary Design, then proceeding to Final
Design and Working Drawings. But, there is no consistent
rule like 25% complete means “X” and 50% complete means
“Y”. However, the data collected did tend to fall into certain
ranges of percent complete and were not categorically
distributed10 as is evident from the histogram presented in
Figure 4.
160

Figure 2: Basic Construction Project Model

The model dictates the type of data that needed to be
obtained: inputs, consisting of the kind if information the
contractor required for production and; outputs: measures of
performance.
Measures of performance in “projects”
generally, have been limited to measures of: Cost, Quality
and Schedule performance. On the input side, we needed to
obtain data that characterized the type on information the
contractor would need as a basis for the contract price (either
a competitive lump sum or a negotiated guaranteed maximum
price.) Both the input and output metrics were determined by
an Expert Panel of industry executives, representing
Architects and Engineers, Contractors, and Owners. The
Input and Output Metrics originally obtained included the
following: Percentage Complete of the plans and
specifications, Quality of the Plans, Owner’s prior experience
in similar projects, Owner budget and schedule expectations,
Contractor team experience, and Access to the site issues.
INPUTS:

OUTPUTS:

Owner/Designer Experience
Budget Performance
Owner Budget/Schedule Expectations
Profit Performance
Contractor PM Experience
Schedule Performance
Labor Recruitment
Access to Site
% Complete Plans & Specification

DEA Model

Safety Performance
# Punch List Items’ s
Finalizing Work

140
120
100
80
60
40
Std. Dev = .18

20

Mean = .90
N = 218.00

0
.13

.25

.38

.50

.63

.75

.88

1.00

PLNS_D

Figure 4 Histogram of %Complete Plans and Specifications

This data and further discussions with Architects on the
Expert Panel, would guide our parsing of the data into
different catagories.
1. Data Collection
The collection of data for this research was a multi-phase
process involving construction contractors, owners,
architects, internet websites and the Portland and Seattle
Daily Journal of Commerce (DJC) newspapers. Ultimately
through all of the difference sources we were able to identify
more than 500 public building projects, 407 of which
generally fit into our research criteria. Of the 407 projects we
obtained some cost information on 367 projects, ranging in

# RFI’ s & APR’s
10

Figure 3: Original DEA Model from Expert Panel Work

By this we mean that all of the data does not fall into specific groupings
like: 25%, 50%, 75% and 100% complete plans and specifications.
However, in spite of the fact that the data does not fall into discrete
categories, they do generally fall into consistent ranges, which we understand
from our Expert Panel represents the different levels of design completeness.

2003 Proceedings of PICMET '03: Technology Management for Reshaping the World

cost11 from a $175,591 CM/GC fire station project to a
$189,859,282, also CM/GC airport expansion project, in sum
totaling $5,050,962,407 of public construction.
Project Delivery
System Type
CM/GC

A summary characterization of the projects by Project
Delivery System is contained in Table1.

TABLE 1 DESCRIPTION OF THE DATA
Number
Smallest
Largest
136

Design Bid Build

191

Unknown

80

Total

407

$175,591
1,400 SF
$663,325
4,600 SF
$223,166
11,300 SF

$189,859,282
1,000,000 SF
$112,497,017
569,000 SF
$35,211,963
270,000 SF

Number with Unknown
Financial Information
8 with no $ data
17 missing some $ data
2 with no $ data
89 missing some $ data
2 with no $ data
78 missing some $ data

11

Of these 407 projects we were only able to obtain
enough data on 218 jobs that allowed us to use them in our
DEA model12. A total of 71 Construction Contractors13 and
70 Architecture firms14 are represented in the project
database, ranking from the largest firms in their respective
sectors in Oregon, to small, even single practitioner offices.
2. Analysis of the Data
The first analysis performed on the data obtained for this
research was to evaluate the population using standard
statistical methods. Figure 5 is a single frequency histogram
of the output metric Budget Performance, which we defined
above as the total final cost divided by the initial bid or
contract guaranteed maximum price. Note the average
Budget Performance is 0.947, with a standard deviation of
0.07. The figure indicates that the data is generally well
distributed with one sole outlier at the extreme left hand side
of the figure.
50

40

30

20

10
Std. Dev = .07
Mean = .947
N = 213.00

0

5
12
1.
5
07
1.
5
02
1.
75
.9
25
.9
75
.8
25
.8
75
.7
25
.7
75
.6
25
.6
75
.5
25
.5
75
.4

25
.4

BUD_PRFD

Figure 5: Budget Performance Metric Histogram

11

These costs are adjusted to 2001 using Engineering News Record’s
Construction
Cost
Index
obtained
from their website
at:
http://enr.construction.com/features/conEco/costIndexes/constIndexHist.asp .
12
Some of these would be eliminated during the model validation phase
13
This number includes two Joint Ventures as separate companies from their
parents.
14
Note that some firms have changed names over the years; we have
attempted to count a firm only once if it added or lost partners along the way.
However, Joint Venture firms were counted separately from their parent
organizations consistent with our treatment with contractors.

120

100

80

60

40

20

Std. Dev = .13
Mean = .94
N = 199.00

0
.44

.56
.50

.69
.63

.81
.75

.94
.88

1.06
1.00

1.19
1.13

SCH_D

Figure 6: Schedule Performance Metric Histogram

Figure 6 is a single frequency histogram of the Schedule
Performance metric, which indicates a much broader
distribution than the Budget Performance metric. This stands
to reason because time is a more available resource than
money in most situations and exceeding planned performance
time is more likely and less costly than exceeding the project
financial resources. It’s far more likely to allow a project to
run longer by 100% of the original schedule, resulting in a
Schedule Performance Metric of 0.50, than increase by
double the cost. An increase in total cost of double would in
fact only occur in projects that undergo a “Cardinal Change”
and therefore, by definition, the original contract value is
irrelevant because it does not reflect the intent of the
contracting parties.
3. Population Independence
The principle purpose of this research was to determine
if the different project delivery systems resulted in better
projects based on certain output metrics as determined by the
Expert Panel.
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TABLE 2 GROUP STATISTICS15

Table 2 presents the Group Statistics for the two
principal populations: DBB (#1) and CM/GC (#2.) What this
analysis tells us is that, while there are differences in the
population, they are slight and not statistically significant.
The important thing to note here is how little variance there is
in the principal output metrics. Another way to look at this
data is given in the two-dimensional plot given in Figure 7 .

Group Statistics

BUD_PRFD
SCH_D

PDS
1
2
1
2

N
101
112
97
102

Mean
.93817
.95411
.94000
.93098

Std. Deviation
.076605
.071808
.129317
.132108

Std. Error
Mean
.007622
.006785
.013130
.013081

Output Metric Plot
1.4

1.2

Schedule Performance

1

0.8

0.6

0.4

0.2

0
0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

1.2

1.4

Budget Performance

Figure 7 - Two Dimensional Plot of the Output Metrics

If there were no inputs, and these were the only outputs,
then the envelopment of this data, shown as a dashed line
above, would give us the technical efficiencies of the
projects. From the plot, it appears that the minimum
efficiency would be in the range of 0.70 or 70%. Again
however, the important thing to note is that the data is not
broadly distributed but instead, it is rather tightly grouped
around the 1.0, 1.0 intersection. In fact, only just slightly
more than 13% (29/218) of the projects with non-zero data
points, fall outside of plus or minus 20% of the 1.0 measure
in either direction. If this were the envelopment data, it
appears that just three projects would form the efficiency
frontier, but we do have inputs and other outputs for this data
15
set.

15

The reader will note that the number of cases are not the same for each
Metric, this is due to the fact that some information is missing in some of the
cases and zero’s have been omitted from this statistical analysis. In the case
of the DEA analysis that follows, zero’s are included in the output measure.

4. DEA Model Analysis
Figure 7 presents a good representation of project
outcomes if inputs are not considered. Our research was
intended to consider both inputs and outputs. However, the
important thing to note from Figure 7, and from out statistical
analysis presented above, is that the project outputs are not
dramatically dissimilar. In fact, while there is quite a range
of outputs, particularly in the schedule performance metric,
the vast majority of the projects had performance outputs that
were substantially similar, with few truly outstanding and few
truly horrible projects. Even those projects that did poorly on
one of the two metrics, appear to have made up for it in the
other. And, the reason the project performance results
presented in Figure 7 are important, is because it directly
impacts how the DEA analysis would be performed.
B. Initial DEA Model Analysis (CRS and VRS Models)
The normal method for evaluating DMUs in DEA is by
application of either a Constant Returns to Scale (CRS)
model or a Variable Returns to Scale (VRS) model. These
models have been used throughout the literature and applied
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in a number of different industries and economic sectors.
However, neither the traditional CRS or VRS models is well
suited to the evaluation of the data set in this research. This
is because of the peculiar fact that the inputs vary so
substantially but the outputs do not. Traditionally, when a

researcher wanted to evaluate a data set of DMUs with
extreme differences in input and output metric values; such as
comparing grocery stores and including mini-marts,
traditional mainstream stores, and warehouse stores in the
same data set, the researcher would apply a VRS model.

VRS DEA Scores
120.00%

100.00%

DMUs

80.00%

60.00%

40.00%

20.00%

0.00%
1

9

17

25

33

41

49

57

65

73

81

89

97 105 113 121 129 137 145 153 161 169 177 185 193 201 209
Efficiency

Figure 8 VRS DEA Scores - Base Model Ranked by Efficiency Score High to Low

Running the VRS Model results in only 130 of 215 total
projects with greater than 50% efficiency scores and 48 of
215 with better than 90% efficiency score. These results do
not correspond to either the results of the statistical analysis
(Table 2 above) or the output plot (Figure 7) nor do they
match the perception of the Expert Panel Members who
uniformly maintained that, except in rare cases, projects
should fall within a narrow range of results.
It is probably intuitive, but the results of a CRS model
are even worse than the VRS model. The CRS model
resulted in only 16 of 215 projects with efficiency scores
above 90% and only 87 of 215 with scores better than 50%.
It should be obvious from these results that the application of
either a CRS or VRS model without significant modification
does not shed any light on the analysis of this construction
project data.
C. Modifying the DEA Model for Construction Project Data
It’s really fairly obvious why the VRS and CRS models
result in the distribution of scores as they do, since the
outputs lay within a rather narrow range and the inputs vary
from 0.25 to 1.0 (or 25% to 100% complete plans and
specifications.) Nearly all of the projects with plans and

specifications of 100% complete will have efficiency scores
below 50% - which is exactly what happens. The problem
comes in the evaluation of those input metrics. Recall that
above we stated that there is no fixed standard for evaluating
percentage complete, and the method we used was simply to
ask the various parties to assign a number based on their past
experience,16 this results in extreme non-linear relationships
between the principal inputs and outputs. While there is
basic agreement that “conceptual design” is less complete in
terms of “% complete plans and specifications” metric than
“schematic design” or “preliminary design” the precise
estimates of the values varies. In other words, one project
managers 25% complete may be another’s 35 or 40%
complete.
In situations where the inputs and outputs are not directly
linearly related and the exact relationship is unknown or not
captured by known inputs, a possible approach would be to
apply a “categorical” variable model. In that case the
“conceptual design” complete projects do not compete
directly with the “final design” complete jobs, but rather they
compete among each other within categories. However, that
16
Note also that 100% complete was the default if no other information was
given.
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would render meaningless the point of this research, which is
in part, to compare the PDS by outcome, against one another
and determine if one type is significantly superior to the
other.
It is important to note also, that the analysis set forth in
Table 2 and described in Figure 7 support Kagel’s point [5],
and our conclusion that the amount of actual “Information”
provided is not captured by the metric “% complete plans and

Owner Provided
Information - Inputs

Contractor
Knowledge &
Experience

specifications” in spite of the fact that the Expert Panel
recommended. This is because the metric fails to take into
account the economic reality of the industry and the amount
of training and experience of the estimators and managers of
the construction companies involved, which is substantial17.
This is perhaps better visualized in the Process Model
suggested by Figure 9.

DEA Model Input

DEA DEA Model Output
Model

Figure 9 Process Model

We know, both from our own study and from industry
standards that the cost of public buildings of virtually all
types resides within a relatively small range. For example,
RS Means Building Construction Cost Data, estimating guide
provides a section that provides per square foot cost estimates
for approximately sixty different type buildings from
Apartments to Warehouses. This data includes estimates at
the 25 percentile, Median, and 75 percentile ranges.
Furthermore, while these data are determined by national
averages, the guide also provides regional indexes to convert
the average costs to a cost for a specific area. Portland,
Oregon for example has a weighted average of about 1.06
times the national cost average for buildings, according to
Means.17
Armed with a commonly available estimating guide and
experience in the local construction market, it is possible,
easy in fact, for a construction estimator to narrow the range
of possible costs far tighter than an input of 25% to 100%
would imply. So, for the purposes of a DEA model, is it
possible to account for this base of knowledge that is an
additional “resource” (or enhances the Information provided
resource) that results in “production” from the model? And
the answer to that question is, probably, but probably not to a
level of certainty that makes the evaluation meaningful.
Also, while we did collect data on the different construction
companies, none of the data we collected as a proxy for
experience (including number of years in business, bonding
capacity, project team experience and so on) could be reliably
tied to a single input metric for “knowledge” that would
differ significantly from company to company. This again,
would make the input meaningless (if for example, all the
companies had the same input value.)
The decision was made to apply a modified categorical
model using successive data sets that included: 1) all project
17
One reason for limiting the projects to a certain size, larger than $5
million, was because we knew that only construction firms with substantial
resources and experience can qualify for Miller Act, performance and
payment bonds, for that size of work.

data; 2) only projects with higher than 40% complete plans
and specifications; 3) only projects with higher than 75%
complete plans and specifications; and finally, 4) only
projects with higher than 95% plans and specifications (in
other words only those that had the design complete.)
Mathematically this revision to the basic DEA formulation in
vector form looks like:
Min: θ
Subject to:

Yλ ≥ Y0
Xλ ≤ θX0
λ≥0
λi = 0 ∀i such that Ci < C0

Define Ci = 1: Conceptual Design: <50% Complete
2: Schematic Design: 50% to 75% Complete
3: Preliminary Design: 75% to 95% Complete
4: Final Design: 95% to 100% Complete
The controlling direction of the analysis was guided by
state statute. In Oregon, as nearly every other state, on public
building projects, the state gives the priority to open public
bidding and discourages closed negotiated procurements
except when it can be shown to be a substantial benefit to the
public. The relevant portions of the particular Oregon statute,
ORS 270.015 is as follows:
279.015 Competitive bidding; exceptions; exemptions.
(1) Subject to the policies and provisions of ORS
279.005 and 279.007, all public contracts shall be based
upon competitive bids or proposals except:
(2) Subject to subsection (6)(b) of this section, the
Director of the Oregon Department of Administrative
Services or a local contract review board may exempt
certain public contracts or classes of public contracts
from the competitive bidding requirements of subsection
(1) of this section upon approval of the following
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findings submitted by the public contracting agency
seeking the exemption:
(b) The awarding of public contracts pursuant to the
exemption will result in substantial cost savings to the
public contracting agency. In making such finding, the
director or board may consider the type, cost, amount of
the contract, number of persons available to bid and such
other factors as may be deemed appropriate.
(3)(a) Before final adoption of the findings required by
subsection (2) of this section exempting a contract for a
public improvement from the requirement of competitive
bidding, a public agency shall hold a public hearing.
It is clear from these sections of the statute that the
Oregon Legislature intended to make the option of exempting
from bidding and negotiating public building contracts a
difficult and well reasoned alternative to open competitive
public bidding, but certainly an option. Since the state has
established the baseline PDS to be DBB, then the negotiated
procurements, the CM/GC projects, must be considered the
“challenger.” Therefore, the challenger, which is disfavored
in the statute, has the burden to show it is superior against the
baseline, whereas the baseline has no such burden18. It is
reasonable to argue that this being the case, there is no need
to evaluate the different levels of information in terms of the

Percent Complete metric, rather, simply run all CM/GC jobs
categorically against all competitors, and then run only the
DBB projects to establish their efficiency scores. While this
obviously can be done, we wanted a finer break-out from the
analysis.
D. Results from the Modified DEA Model
We did not recode the existing computer software
instead the Modified DEA Model was run using EMS®
Software from project data stored in an Excel® spreadsheet.
Four passes were made on the data each using a CCR, Input
Oriented Model19. The first pass included all data in the
project database but was only used to calculate the DEA
scores of the projects with less than 50% plans and
specifications. The second pass included all the data for
projects with plans and specifications more than 50%
complete, but again was used only to calculate the DEA
scores for projects with plans and specifications between 50%
and 75% complete. The third pass included all projects with
plans and specifications more than 75% complete and was
used to calculate the DEA efficiency scores for projects with
plans and specifications between 75% and 95% complete.
Finally, the fourth pass included only projects with plans and
specifications more than 95% complete and was used to
calculate these project’s DEA efficiency scores.
The results of this process is depicted in Table 10 below:

Modified Model Efficiency Scores
120.00%

Efficiency Score

100.00%
80.00%
60.00%
40.00%
20.00%
0.00%
1

12 23 34 45 56 67 78 89 100 111 122 133 144 155 166 177 188 199 210
DMUs - Projects

Figure 10 Modified Model Efficiency Scores1819
18
19

This argument is drawn directly from the plain language wording of §2(B) of ORS 279.015
All of these passes were made without regard to the quality of the information metric SF/(RFI+AR)
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The DEA efficiency scores from the Modified Model,
range from approximately 67% to 100% and have an
arithmetic mean of 91.52%20, as presented in Table 3 below.
Also shown is a single frequency histogram of the DEA
efficiency scores from the Modified Model, presented in
Figure 11.

The results obtained by the Modified Model are more
consistent with the Expert Panel’s intuitive understanding of
construction project performance than the results obtained in
the earlier DEA models depicted in Figure 8. Fifty-seven of
the 215 projects in the final data set were determined to be
100% efficient, and 140 projects scored 90% or higher.

TABLE 3 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF DEA SCORES FROM
MODIFIED MODEL

E. Evaluating the Project Delivery Systems
The next step in our analysis was to evaluate the two
project delivery systems, DBB (Design Bid Build or Lump
Sum Bid) and CM/GC (Construction Management/General
Contractor the Negotiated Procurement method.) This was
done by applying normal statistical methods, reserving of
course, the same caveats about statistical analysis of DEA
score distributions that was previously discussed. Both the
group statistics and the tests for independence are presented
in Table 4 and Table 5 respectively21.

Descriptive Statistics
N
SCORE
Valid N (listwise)

215
215

Minimum
67%

Maximum
100%

Mean
91.52%

Std. Deviation
7.759%

70

60

50

TABLE 4 GROUP STATISTICS OF DEA SCORES FROM THE
MODIFIED MODEL

40

Group Statistics

30

20

SCORE
Std. Dev = 7.76

10

Mean = 91.5

TYPE
C
L

N

Mean
92.50%
90.48%

111
104

Std. Deviation
8.592%
6.643%

Std. Error
Mean
.815%
.651%

N = 215.00

0
66.0

70.0

68.0

74.0

72.0

78.0

76.0

82.0

80.0

86.0

84.0

90.0

88.0

94.0

92.0

98.0

96.0

100.0

SCORE

Figure 11 Histogram of all DEA efficiency Scores from the Modified Model

TABLE 5 TEST FOR INDEPENDENT POPULATIONS FOR PDS BASED ON DEA SCORES FROM THE MODIFIED MODEL
Independent Samples Test
Levene's Test for
Equality of Variances

F
SCORE

Equal variances
assumed
Equal variances
not assumed

9.897

Sig.
.002

t-test for Equality of Means

t

df

Sig. (2-tailed)

Mean
Difference

Std. Error
Difference

95% Confidence
Interval of the
Difference
Lower
Upper

1.921

213

.056

2.02%

1.052%

-.052%

4.096%

1.937

205.718

.054

2.02%

1.044%

-.036%

4.080%

The statistical analysis of the DEA scores gives similar
results as that produced on the base output data analysis
presented in Table 2. That is, in spite of the fact the CM/GC
negotiated procurements have a slightly higher average there
is no statistically significant difference between the two PDS
groups in terms of DEA scores from the Modified Model.

2021

20
DEA scores are known to be non-normally distributed however both the
arithmetic mean and the standard deviation do provide us with valuable
information about the distribution of the DEA data.
21
Note in Table 4, “C” is used for CM/GC projects and “L” us used for
Lump Sum Bid jobs.

Since DEA is a non-parametric method and the DEA
scores are distinctly not normally distributed, another way of
evaluating any difference in the two populations is to actually
look at the distributions and apply non-parametric techniques.
Observing these two populations we note that the CM/GC
projects have a higher proportion of 100% efficient projects
than do the DBB jobs. In fact, 41 of 111 CM/GC projects
were determined to be 100% efficient, whereas only 15 of the
104 DBB jobs were determined to be 100% efficient.
However this difference becomes less distinct when you
compare all projects with 90% or better efficiency scores; in
that case, 64 of the 104 DBB jobs scored better than 90%
efficient, while 74 of the 111 CM/GC projects scored 90% or
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better. And, on the other end of the spectrum, six of the 111
CM/GC projects scored less than 75% efficient, whereas only
one of the DBB jobs scored lower than 75%.
IV. SUMMARY & CONCLUSIONS
A. Summary of Analysis
This research sets forth a method to deal with data that is
both imprecise but known to exist within certain limits and is
non-linearly related to output performance in the Data
Envelopment Method model. The research uses input
information metrics to evaluate the performance of
construction projects based on two different project delivery
methods: Design Bid Build, the common method of open
competitive lump sum low bid selection; and Construction
Manager/General Contractor, a negotiated public construction
procurement method used extensively in Oregon since 1986.
In order to compare the two methods the data was broken
up into different input categories basically reflecting the
different stages of design: Conceptual Design, Schematic
Design, Preliminary Design, and Final Design, while keeping
the precise estimates provide in the data set from the different
data sources (Construction Contractor, Architect, and Owner,
project management personnel assigned to the specific jobs.)
Since public policy in Oregon favors open competitive lump
sum bidding, the CM/GC projects were used as
“Challengers” and competed against the bid projects to
determine their DEA scores, whereas the bid projects
generally competed against only other bid jobs.
The results of this research show that there is no
statistically significant difference between the procurement
methods based on an analysis of either the raw output metrics
or the DEA efficiency scores from our Modified Model.
However, analysis of the populations does indicate that the
CM/GC projects have both a higher likelihood of being 100%
efficient than the DBB projects, and a higher likelihood of
being below 75% efficient than the DBB projects. Both
methods appear to produce about the same proportion of
projects in the 90% or better range, which is probably
“acceptable” for public construction projects.
B. Conclusions
In a certain limited number of instances, the input
metrics for a DEA model are not capable of properly
capturing the total amount of resources available to produce
performance outputs because they are either: unknown, not
precisely measurable or highly non-linear, in terms of inputs
to outputs. This is the case in the public construction
contracting sector of the economy, where the inputs include
not only what the Contractor is given by the Owner in terms
of plans and specifications in order to determine a price, but
also must include his knowledge and experience both in the
type of work and the local market. And while it’s probably
true that the more experienced contractors with greater the
knowledge are probably better able to convert information
provided by the Owner into inputs for the DEA Construction

Project model, that process is neither well understood nor
easily measured. Therefore a modified categorical variable
approach was developed and used to overcome these
shortcomings.
The principal conclusion that we draw from this research
is that there is no significant difference between the two
project delivery systems either in terms of their DEA scores
or the statistical analysis of the raw output metrics for
schedule and budget performance. Since the public policy of
the State of Oregon asserts a preference for competitive open
public bidding except in specific cases provided for under the
exemption clause, namely a significant financial benefit to
the public, this research under those conditions does not
support the use of negotiated public procurements. However,
it is not so much our view that the negotiated procurement
method is bad, but rather that the policy is wrong. In fact, it
is probably best to look at our analysis from the reverse side
of the public policy, that is: since there is no significant
difference between the two populations, the public pays no
additional price for using the negotiated procurement method
instead of the competitive open public bid method. That
conclusion recommends a reexamination of the public policy
exemption criteria, which most certainly needs to be changed.
C. Future Work
This research is neither the final word on this DEA
application nor the public policy debate regarding the
procurement of construction services for public projects.
Clearly there is a need to better understand the process by
which certain types of information are converted into inputs
for DEA models in order to apply DEA to a broader set of
service sector applications.
The process construction
contractor’s undergo is similar to the process that any
professional consultant undergoes in order to produce a
product or outcome for an owner. Whether that person is an
Accountant, Architect or Engineer, all are given a varying
amount of information from their client, which they convert
into useful inputs through some “process model” and
eventually into outputs. The same perhaps can be said of
physicians treating patients. Absent that understanding, the
linkage between the information and the outputs in the DEA
model, are far to non-linear to produce acceptable and
reasonable results using DEA.
As for the policy debate regarding construction
contracting project delivery methods, it is clear from our
research that the legislature has to come to grips with the fact
that the current policy is simply unworkable since it cannot
be supported by either empirical or theoretical data analysis.
The focus of this effort should be in better aligning the policy
goals with the benefits that can be achieved by the different
methods. The fact that the public pays no additional cost for
starting a project at the conceptual or preliminary design
phases is a clear indication of the advantages presented by the
method that is totally ignored in the policy statement.
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